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Understanding Epigenetic Proaction
A Reply to Stephan Schleim
Kathinka Evers
Epigenetic proaction can be described as a way of steering evolution by influen-
cing the cultural imprints stored in our brains. It is not to be confused with “hu-
man enhancement”. It is a process on the societal level that need not conflict with
the notion of autonomy, nor suggest any “superhuman” ideal. Risks of misuse jus-
tify  precaution,  not  abandonment  of  constructive  scientific  pursuits.  Scientific
knowledge can help us improve our life conditions in the long-term. A naturalistic
responsibility is born out of science’s strong social relevance.
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1 Introduction
Epigenetic proaction can be described as a way of
steering evolution by influencing the cultural im-
prints that are stored in our brains. The question
analysed in my target article is what exactly this
means and whether it is possible. Can we adapt
our societies to constructively interact with the
ever-developing  neuronal  architecture  of  our
brains? The issue of whether such interaction is
desirable is also raised but not discussed in depth.
In  order  to  decide  whether  an  action
should be pursued it would be wise to first at-
tempt  to  understand  its  nature  and  implica-
tions.  Regrettably,  in  his  commentary  to  my
article,  Stephan  Schleim  fails  to  acknowledge
the main concern of my paper, namely the sci-
entific  issue,  moving instead to the normative
question  via  some  less  relevant  detours.  The
commentary  therefore  becomes  misleading.
Rather than engaging with the scientific points
I  make,  Schleim  takes  as  a  starting  point  a
flawed  understanding  of  epigenetic  proaction
and tries to show how undesirable it would be.
The arguments have little to do with the article
on which he purports to comment.
2 Confusing epigenetic proaction with 
human enhancement
After  making  the  assertion  that  “the  actual
means—whether  neurobiological,  psychological,
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or  social—do  not  matter  very  much”  in  his
philosophical  analysis  of  epigenetic  proaction,
Schleim proceeds to relate my position to the
general debate on “human enhancement” (this
collection, p. 2). A long discussion follows about
this  debate  that,  although  quite  popular
amongst  some  contemporary  philosophers,  is
here out of context. In the target article, there
is no mention of individual cognitive, moral, or
performance enhancement, nor any mention of
pharmaceutical  “smart  pills”  and  so  on.  The
target article does not speak of epigenetic pro-
action as an individual opt-in/opt-out thing at
all, nor does it speak of enhancement. And it
certainly does not recommend, as  Schleim sug-
gests  at  the  end  of  his  commentary  “the  at-
tempt to create superhuman beings” (this col-
lection, p. 15). The statement that my theory
proposes methods for parents “aimed at rewir-
ing the nervous system of their children for a
social aim” (Schleim this collection, p. 10) is a
caricature. Perhaps the author has not read the
target  paper  quite  thoroughly  enough.  This
would explain why the author does not specific-
ally address any of the scientific issues raised in
the paper.
3 Well-being and exaggerated virtues
In the commentary, the subsequent discussion is
about who defines well-being and how. Whilst
this in itself is an interesting question that de-
serves  careful  consideration  from  many  per-
spectives, it is not directly relevant to the target
article.  The  article  raises  the  question  of
whether  epigenetic  proaction  is  possible,  and
presents scientific data and theories to explain
what this means. On that basis, I suggest that
they can be taken to support the view that it
may indeed be possible. The questions of defin-
ing well-being or of specifying who should be in
charge of defining well-being, whilst interesting,
fall out of this scope.
In contrast, the question of “side-effects”
can  with  some  effort  be  considered  at  least
somewhat relevant to the article under debate.
Here, Schleim wonders: is it possible, e.g., to re-
duce aggression without making a person weak
or meek? Can a less aggressive person defend
him- or herself  against a more aggressive per-
son?  He  seems  to  be  doubtful,  but  my short
reply is: obviously, yes. Much education, of chil-
dren  in  particular  and  in  human  societies  in
general, includes attempts to check aggression—
it does not thereby create either wimps or zom-
bies.  Even  martial  arts  focus  explicitly  on
checking aggression, whilst by definition aiming
to make students excellent in combat. Schleim
also wonders about the risky side-effects of in-
creasing  sympathy.  He  warns  that  increasing
sympathy  too  much  could  perhaps  lead  to  a
“dysfunctional self–other distinction” that “may
play a role in schizophrenia”. However, even if
this were the case, this is not a necessary—or
even  very  common—side-effect  of  increasing
sympathy.  Certainly,  when we bring  our  chil-
dren up to sympathise with others, we may in-
crease their distress at the sight of suffering in
others, but I do not believe that we thereby in-
crease  their  risk  of  developing  schizophrenia.
Moreover,  as  a  general  principle,  that  an  ini-
tially positive value can become negative if ex-
aggerated does not entail that we should stop
seeking it altogether. If that were the case, we
would have little to strive for.
4 Epigenetic proaction: A process on the 
societal level
Schleim compares  my theory to  the  famously
misconceived social engineering projects of Skin-
ner and Delgado, for whom, Schleim says, the
goals  blessed  the  means.  He  argues  (Schleim
this collection, p. 9) that these “utopian propos-
als” stand “in obvious conflict with the notion
of  autonomy”,  as  understood  by  Immanuel
Kant: no being must be treated only as a means
to an end, but as an end in itself. I agree with
Kant‘s principle and see no conflict between it
and the notion of epigenetic proaction. There is
nothing in the idea of epigenetic proaction as I
develop it in my article that suggests treating
people as mere means to a social end, or of al-
lowing them to “become mere instruments for
the present system” (Schleim this collection, p.
9). The idea in itself is neutral in this regard: of
course the idea can be misused—all science can
be misused—but it is no part of the theory to
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have this negative consequence. In other words,
there  is  no  essential  conflict  between  human
autonomy  and  human  epigenetic  proaction
properly understood.
As for the issue of informed consent that
Schleim raises in that context, it does not dir-
ectly arise through the topics I address in my
article, but it would arise in the research that I
recommend be pursued. Epigenetic proaction is
a process on the societal level.  When, for ex-
ample, educational structures and methods are
adopted  in  a  functioning  democratic  society,
people  are  invited  to  express  their  views
through political elections, public debates, con-
sensus conferences, etc.; but we do not ask each
citizen for an individual informed consent. Nor
do we ask for it when laws are passed. For ex-
ample,  in  1979,  corporeal  punishment  of  chil-
dren became illegal in Sweden. The decision was
preceded (and followed) by public debate and,
as with most rules and regulations, some agreed
with the ruling, while others did not—but the
question  of  informed  consent  does  not  here
arise. In contrast, if research in the natural and
social sciences collaborate, e.g., to develop edu-
cational structures to assist and protect adoles-
cents during that difficult phase of cerebral de-
velopment, insofar as such research requires the
use of human subjects individual informed con-
sent will be needed. That this is the case is not
a specific problem of the theory, but an ethical
regulation (amongst many others) that all  re-
search must respect.
5 Opposing world-views
Concerning  the  human condition,  surprisingly,
Schleim criticises me for being overly concerned
about the present  states  of  poverty,  war,  and
the  many  current  violations  of  human  rights
around the world. He dismisses these worries as
“rhetorical” (again comparing my arguments to
those of Skinner and Delgado). Schleim seems
to be at relative ease with the present state and
future  of  humanity  and,  referencing  Steven
Pinker, draws the conclusion that there is hope
that things will change for the better, so there
is no need to be epigenetically proactive. Differ-
ent world-views here confront one another.
Schleim  concludes  in  what  seems  to  me
again a spirit  of  denial  that  people might  be
saddened by “focusing too much on their defi-
ciencies”  and ends  his  commentary by saying
that “in the attempt to create superhuman be-
ings a human catastrophe might  also  be pro-
voked” (Schleim this collection, p. 12). True, no
doubt—as, notably, Germany’s recent past illus-
trates. But this is not particularly relevant to
my article: there is nothing in the theory of epi-
genetic  proaction  to  suggest  that  we  either
should or could create “superhumans”.
6 Conclusion
Trying  to  understand  and  influence  human
norms  in  the  light  of  what  we  today  know
about the brain is not an easy task. The sci-
entific challenge is increased by the remarkable
emotionality with which this whole area of re-
search is permeated and which can apparently
make it hard to see clearly what is actually be-
ing  said.  This  emotionality  is  in  part  under-
standable: the notion of improving the human
condition, including our biology, comes in some
very sordid versions, as ideas of “racial purity”
or “ethnic supremacy” serve to illustrate,  and
which remain present in various societies around
the world. Historic awareness is indeed essential
to safeguard constructive and hope-inspiring sci-
entific  ideas  from being  hijacked by nefarious
ideologies (or, indeed, interpretations) and ab-
used for unscientific purposes. However, the risk
of misuse justifies precaution, not abandonment
of constructive scientific pursuits.
Research  collaborations  between  neuros-
cience,  genetics  and  social  science,  notably,
today provide rich and multifaceted knowledge
about the human being and an increasingly in-
tegrated view of us as biological organisms in-
teracting in complex natural and cultural envir-
onments  in  constant  evolution.  The  resulting
knowledge could further help us improve our life
conditions, e.g., by assisting us in finding rem-
edies for the developmental crises of adolescents,
or excessive societal violence. What I call our
“naturalistic responsibility” is born out of sci-
ence’s strong social relevance. Whether or not
in  the  future  we  shall  use  this  knowledge
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soundly remains to be seen. Which traits we de-
cide  to  favour  epigenetically,  or  what  social
structures  we  choose  to  develop,  depends  on
who “we” are, and on the society in which we
wish to live. We may hope that young scientists
and  philosophers  shall  rise  well  to  that  chal-
lenge, and develop the idea of epigenetic pro-
activity into a dynamic and socially responsible
area of research.
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